The on-demand approach, where systems are assembled from components by lay users, has seen success in the consumer electronics industry. Currently, there is growing demand for on-demand capabilities in medical systems so caregivers can create larger medical systems from smaller medical devices. Unlike consumer electronics, medical systems pose challenges for the on-demand approach due to attributes such as device complexity, device variability and safety requirements. In this paper, we propose a formal specification language for on-demand (medical) systems. Our approach is based on the formalism of Modal I/O Automata, which allows system designers to express complex device requirements and can be used to reason about safety and liveness properties of on-demand medical systems directly from their specifications. We illustrate the applicability of our approach through a case study of a closed-loop patient controlled analgesia system. we propose a formal specication language for on-demand (medical) systems. Our approach is based on the formalism of Modal I/O Automata, which allows system designers to express complex device requirements and can be used to reason about safety and liveness properties of ondemand medical systems directly from their specications. We illustrate the applicability of our approach through a case study of a closed-loop patient controlled analgesia system.
Introduction
An on-demand system is any system assembled by a lay user out of components that have not been previously tested together. An example on-demand system is a home entertainment system: A typical home theater is composed of speakers, an audio/visual receiver, a content source (such as a DVD player or streaming video device), and television. Assembly of these on-demand systems is facilitated by a`plug-and-play' capability in the components themselves; in theory each component conforms to a well dened standard (e.g., USB, HDMI, Bluetooth) which then ensures that the components properly compose to form a functioning system. The standards typically dene a small set of rigid component Recently, there has been interest in on-demand medical systems where health care workers can assemble larger medical systems out of smaller medical devices at the bedside in order to provide better therapy for their patients [25] . These on-demand systems would be used to provide better physiologic alarms (by combining data streams from multiple medical devices) and closed loop control (using physiologic sensors to drive actuators). While there is demand from the medical community, critical care medical systems have two major attributes which pose engineering challenges for the on-demand approach.
First, medical devices tend to be more complex. Unlike consumer electronics, critical care medical devices are very complex and variable, even among devices designed for a similar purpose (e.g., infusion pumps). Often, this complexity and variability is the result of dierent ways device manufacturers have chosen to mitigate certain safety hazards. The complexity and variability means it is dicult to capture the range of behavior of a single device class in a standard similar to USB where the features and behavior of each class are fully enumerated beforehand. Second, on-demand medical systems serve a safety critical purpose; if the composite system malfunctions or is implemented incorrectly injury or death could result. Traditional safety critical systems such as aircraft, nuclear power plants and standalone medical devices are evaluated for safety before they are delivered to the user. The state of the art in safety assesment is to consider the completely assembled system as a whole. In on-demand medical systems this would not be possible because each system instance may be assembled by combining devices that have never been tested together. There must be some mechanism in place to analyze the behavior of all instantiations of a on-demand system in order to ensure that any instantiation only exhibits safe behavior.
There have been a number of high-level proposals for how to achieve safe on-demand medical systems [20, 11, 25, 5] . These proposals all involve separating system functionality between interoperable componenets: coordination applications (apps), medical devices, and a Medical Application Platform (MAP). In these proposals, each type of system component would be regulated, certied, and then obtained by the health-care organization separately [12] . We now provide a brief overview of the role and use of each system component type.
Apps are software programs that provide the coordination algorithm for a specic clinical scenario (i.e., smart alarms, closed-loop control of devices, etc.). In addition to executable code, these apps contain device requirements declarations: a formal model of the medical devices they need to operate correctly.
These apps would be validated and veried against their requirements specication before they are marketed. Symmetrically, the interoperable medical devices carry a self-descriptive model, known as a capabilities specication. Each medical device would be certied that it conforms to its specication before it is marketed and sold to end users.
The MAP provides a trusted base: It executes the coordination apps and facilitates the assembly of the on-demand system. When a user connects a medical device to the network, that medical device will transmit its capabilities speci-cation to the MAP. Likewise, when a user attempts to launch an app, the MAP analyzes the app's requirements specication and the connected devices' capabilities specications. If the devices do not have the required capabilities, the MAP will prevent the app from running and notify the user. This functionality is critical to the assembly of on-demand medical systems because it is the foundation for any safety or eectiveness claim; in theory only systems which exhibit the behavior captured by the app (and its associated requirements specication) will be instantiated. This enables various stakeholders (e.g., app developers and regulatory agencies) to verify and validate the behavior of all possible instantiations of an on-demand system by checking the behavior of the application against its requirements specication.
Finally, each of these components would implement an interoperability standard. The standard would specify allowed network transport protocols, how medical and system information is encoded on the network, provide a basic means to establish an interconnection between components, and expose logical interfaces for the transmission of data or commands. Current interoperability standards, such as IEEE-11073 POC [16] , IEEE-11073 PHD [9, 8] and Health Level 7 (HL7) [10] focus mainly on data interoperability (i.e., they provide a mechanism for the exchange of data). Notably absent in current standards is the ability to address the reactive behavior of various medical systems. This means that current standards are largely unsuitable for interoperable medical systems where multiple devices are coordinating to provide autonomous delivery of care.
Our ability to reason about an on-demand medical system a priori (i.e., before it is instantiated) depends on how the app requirements and device capabilities are specied. There are three major goals that must be met by a suitable specication language: G1 The language must enable us to automatically relate app device requirements specications to device capabilities specications: properties which must hold for apps composed with their requirements specication must hold for any ad hoc system where the app is composed with compatible devices.
G2
The language must enable app developers to explicitly specify variability in required device behavior: if all safety properties are satised with a highly variable device requirements specication it means the app is compatible with a larger set of medical devices.
G3
The language must be expressive enough to specify arbitrarily complex and reactive behavior.
In this paper, we propose a modal specication language for on-demand systems which addresses G1, G2 and G3. This formalism could be layered onto existing standards to enable the specication of device behavior. Syntactically, it is a simple, state-based language inspired by Alur and Henzinger's Reactive Modules formalism [1] . Semantically, each module dened in the language is equivalent to a modal I/O automaton (MIOA) [24] , a formalism that extends labeled transitions systems with a may/must modality on transitions and an input/output/internal distinction on action labels.
MIOAs are well suited for reasoning about on-demand systems for the following reasons. First, the may/must distinction of transitions is useful for specifying the behavioral variability of devices: must transitions denote required behavior and may transitions represent allowed behavior. Thus, we can use MIOAs to reason about all possible instantiations of an on-demand system based on the specication. Second, we show that the weak modal renement relation of MIOAs preserves both safety (nothing bad happens) and liveness (something good eventually happens) properties. The guarantee of safety and liveness properties are essential for on-demand medical systems, e.g., the patient's SpO 2 level should never be lower than 95" (safety) the laser must be completely deactivated to allow the ow of the oxygen concentrate from the ventilator" (liveness)
Third, the compositionality of MIOAs allows us to easily verify the behavior of component-based on-demand systems by verifying their specications. For example, if we nd a medical device that renes an app's requirements specication, then we can claim that the system created by composing the app with that device will satisfy all safety and liveness properties satised by the composition of that app and its requirements specication.
We have prototyped our approach using the MIO Workbench tool [6] and the PRISM model checker [22] , and applied it to a few case studies. In this paper, we report on the application of our approach to the case study of a closed loop patient controlled analgesia system. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we describe one possible application of on-demand medical systems as a motivating example. In Section 3 we describe our proposed specication language and the underlying MIOA semantics. Section 4 contains a case study where we apply language to specify an on-demand medical system and then verify properties of that system. We conclude the paper, discuss current weaknesses of the approach, and propose directions for future work in Section 5.
Motivating Example
In this section we describe Patient Controlled Analgesia (PCA), the hazards of PCA, and how a closed-loop system could be used to mitigate those hazards. The purpose of the example itself is twofold. First it illustrates how the functionality of the closed-loop system can be divided between an app and medical devices.
Second, it allows us to show variability among the same class of medical device and how that variability can aect the safety of an on-demand system.
After trauma (e.g., invasive surgery) patients convalescing in an ICU are often placed on PCA therapy for pain management. During PCA therapy, patients are attached to an infusion pump loaded with a painkiller (e.g., an opiod). When the patient desires additional pain-relief, they press a trigger which causes the pump to deliver a bolus of medication. While PCA lets patients manage their own pain-levels eectively [15] it also creates an opportunity for overdose. Opiod [26, 19] .
As shown in Figure 1 , the system consists of four components: a pulse oximeter, an app, a PCA infusion pump and a patient. The system operates in a closed-loop fashion: the pulse oximeter keeps monitoring the patient's SpO 2 value (measure of blood oxygenation), and the app controls the PCA pump based on the SpO 2 value read from the pulse oximeter (the app would stop the pump if the detected SpO 2 value is lower than 95). When the PCA pump is turned on, it delivers drug to the patient with a normal infusion rate pre-programmed by the caregiver; however, if it receives a bolus request from the patient, then a higher drug dose will be supplied, unless the pump is stopped by the app.
This application has one main safety property: the infusion rate of the pump should always be 0 (i.e., the pump is o ) whenever the patient has an SpO 2 below a certain threshold (e.g., SpO 2 < 95). The satisfaction of this property depends on both the algorithm implemented by the app and the behavior of the PCA pump the app is managing. Figure 2 illustrates the behavior of three dierent types of PCA pumps as state machines. Figure 2a represents a simple infusion pump that infuses while it receives the on signal. Technically speaking, the pump of Figure 2a is not a PCA pump because it doesn't provide any mechanism for the patient to request a bolus. Figure 2b represents a PCA pump that will infuse at a rate of 1 while it receives the on signal and it will infuse at a rate of 2 when the patient requests a bolus, even if it is receiving the o.
Finally, Figure 2c represents an even more complex PCA pump. This pump will autonomously disable itself under a number of conditions in order to mitigate several hazards associated with infusion pumps [4] . For example, if the pump detects air bubbles in the infusion line, it will halt infusion and raise an alarm in order to prevent an air-embolism.
So, which pump should we choose to use? If we plug any of these three pumps into the system, will the patient's safety be guaranteed? And is there an easy way to verify the eectiveness of the PCA system? These questions will be answered in Section 4 by applying our modal specication approach, which is explained in the next section.
A Specication Language for on-demand Systems
In this section, we propose a simple, state-based specication language for describing the requirements of on-demand systems. This language can be applied, for example, by app developers to specify the desirable behavior of compatible medical devices. The language is based on Alur and Henzinger's Reactive Modules formalism [1] , with the extension of transition modality (i.e., distinguishing must and may transitions). We rst dene the syntax of our proposed language in Section 3.1, and then give its semantics in Section 3.2.
Syntax
We dene each component of an on-demand system as a module M , which is a tuple
is the signature of M representing sets of input, output and internal actions, var M is a set of state variables, and (must M , may M ) are sets of must and may transitions.
A module communicates with the external environment via input and output actions in the CSP style [14] ; that is, an input (resp. output) action, denoted by c?v (resp. c!v), enables the module to receive (resp. send) message v over a named channel c. The message v, which for example can be an expression about some previous inputs or a valuation of some local variable of the module, must be typed. Sometimes, message v is omitted from an input/output action, denoted by c? or c!, with the interpretation that there is only a single possible message can be transmitted through channel c. The variable set var M denes the local state space of module M . A state variable s ∈ var M can be either a Boolean value, or an integer within a predened nite range. We suppose that each variable s has an initial value s.
The behavior of module M is dened by the set of must/may transitions (must M , may M ). Each transition t ∈ must M ∪ may M takes the form (a, g, m, u), comprising an action label a, a guard g, a modality label m and an update u. The action a ∈ in M ∪out M ∪int M can be either an input/output action synchronizing with the external environment, or an internal event occurring within the module.
The guard g is a predicate over the state variables var M , determining if transition t is enabled. The modality label m ∈ {must, may} indicates if the transition is required (i.e., must occur) in all implementations or if it is allowed (i.e., may occur) in any implementation. The update u describes the eect of transition t on state variables; more specically, u = (s 1 = expr 1 )∧· · · (s n = expr n ) where s i denotes the updated value of state variable s i ∈ var M , and expr i is an expression in terms of the state variables.
Example 1. Figure 3 shows an example module M 1 described in our proposed specication language. The description is split into four parts, dening actions, state variables, as well as must and may transitions of the module. The module M 1 has two input actions: a?integer[1..2]" that receives a integer value within the range {1, 2} via channel a", and b?" that receives an input via channel b" (the message is omitted). The module may send an output through action c!", and has a single internal action τ .
We also see that M 1 has a single interger-valued variable s with the range {0, . . . , 3} and an initial value 0. There are four transitions in 
Semantics
The semantics of our specication language is based on Modal I/O Automata [24] which in turn are extensions of Modal Transition Systems [23] . A modal I/O automaton (MIOA) can be considered as a (nondeterministic) state transition system with an input/output/internal distinction on action labels and a must/may distinction on its transition relations.
Denition 1 (MIOA). A modal I/O automaton P is a tuple (S P , s P , in P , out P , int P , → P , → ♦P ) where S P is a nite set of states, s P ∈ S P is an initial state, in P , out P and int P are disjoint sets of input, output and internal actions, → P ⊆ S P × act P × S P is the must transition relation describing required behavior, and → ♦P ⊆ S P × act P × S P is the may transition relation describing allowed behavior (act P = in P ∪ out P ∪ int P ).
The mapping from a module M = (in M , out M , int M ), var M , (must M , may M ) described in our proposed specication language to a MIOA P is straightforward. We dene the state space S P of P to be the set of all valuations of the state variables in var M . The initial state s P is given by the initial values of variables in var M . The action sets in P = in M , out P = out M , and int P = int M . And each transition t ∈ must M (resp. t ∈ may M ) maps to a transition p a − → P p (resp. p a − → ♦P p ) in P , where p and p are states given by the guard and update of t, In this paper, we consider only syntactically consistent MIOA where → P ⊆→ ♦P , i.e., every required transition is also allowed. If the must and may transition relations of a MIOA P coincide, denoted → P =→ ♦P , then we call P an implementation. An abstract MIOA with nonempty must and may transition relations species a set of concrete implementations: a must transition asks that any legal implementation must include that transition, while a may transition indicates that implementations are allowed (but not required) to have that transition.
Formally, the relation between an abstract specication MIOA and a concrete implementation MIOA is captured by renements. There are many dierent types of renement relations between MIOAs [24, 7] . In our setting, we adopt the weak modal renement relation [7] , which ensures that the observable behavior of an implementation (e.g., actual medical device) renes the specication (e.g., app requirements).
We need the notion of weak transitions to reason about the observable behavior of MIOAs. Given an input/output action a of a MIOA P , there exists a weak must transition between states p and p , denoted by p ( Denition 2 (Weak Modal Renement). Given two MIOAs P and Q with in P = in Q and out P = out Q , a relation R ⊆ S P × S Q is called a weak modal renement for P and Q i for all (p, q) ∈ R and a ∈ act P ∪ act Q it holds that:
otherwise. If there exists a renement relation R such that (s P , s Q ) ∈ R, then we claim that P weakly modally renes Q, denoted by P ≤ * m Q.
The weak modal renement relation dened above allows implementations to contain dierent (i.e., unspecied) internal behavior as long as the internal behavior does not prevent the implementation from performing required external behavior. The renement also prevents implementations from performing`extra' external behavior as long as the extra behavior is specied in the signature of the specication. It does allow implementations to introduce new external behavior if that behavior is an action-label not specied in the specication; in this case, the transitions labled with that action are treated as τ transitions. Recall that, in our proposed specication language, a module (medical device) can comminucate with the external environment via sending/receiving messages. We now introduce a binary composition operator [24] 
Denition 3 (Composition). The composition of two composeable MIOAs P 1 and P 2 is given by a MIOA P 1 ⊗P 2 = (S, s, in, out, int, → , → ♦ ), where the state
and the transition relations are given by the following rules (for γ ∈ { , ♦}):
Example 4. Figure 5 shows the composition of two MIOAs M 1 (Figure 4a A motivation of our work is to design a specication language that makes verifying properties of medical devices easy. In particular, we are interested in two kinds of properties: safety (something bad will never happen) and liveness (something good will eventually happen). Formally, a safety property φ safe is dened as a liner-time property over a set of actions such that any innite word w where φ safe does not hold contains a bad prex (i.e., a nite prex w where the bad thing has happened); a liveness property φ live (over a set of actions) is an linear-time property such that each nite word can be extended to an innite word that satises φ live .
Given a MIOA P and a safety or liveness property φ over act P , we dene two satisfaction relations:
P |= φ, under-approximates all renements of P satisfy φ"; P |= ♦ φ, over-approximates some renement of P satises φ".
To verify property φ on P , we need to prove that P |= φ is true; and to refute property φ, we need to establish that P |= ¬φ holds.
We prove that weak modal renement preserves the verication of safety and liveness properties as follows.
Lemma 1. Let P and Q be two MIOAs such that P ≤ * m Q. Given a safety property φ safe over actions in P ∪ out P , if Q |= φ safe , then P |= φ safe .
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, suppose Q |= φ safe and P |= φ safe . The latter means that there may exist some path ρ in P containing a bad prex. For simplicity, assume that the bad behavior is represented by a single word a. We have a path ρ = p 0 → · · · → p n−1 a − → ♦P p n . Based on P ≤ * m Q and Denition 2, there exists a pair of states q and q in Q such that (p n−1 , q) ∈ R, (p n , q ) ∈ R and q (
Therefore, there may exist a path in Q containing the bad word a, which is a contradiction with Q |= φ safe .
Lemma 2. Let P and Q be two MIOAs such that P ≤ * m Q. Given a liveness property φ live over actions in P ∪ out P , if Q |= φ live , then P |= φ live .
Proof. Since Q |= φ live , every (innite) path in Q must eventually reach the good condition. For simplicity, assume that the good condition is represented by a single word a. Then, there must exists a pair of states q n−1 and q n in any (innite) path ρ of Q such that ρ = q 0 → · · · → q n−1 a − → Q q n → · · · . Based on P ≤ * m Q and Denition 2, for each pair of q n−1 and q n , there must exists a pair of corresponding states p, p in P such that (p, q n−1 ) ∈ R, (p , q n ) ∈ R and p (
Therefore, every innite path in P must eventually reach the good condition, so that we have P |= φ live .
Another nice feature about weak modal renement is the following compositionality result:
Theorem 1 (Compositionality [2] ). Let P 1 ,P 1 and P 2 be MIOAs (P 1 and Q are composable). If
Based on the above theorem and Lemmas 1 and 2, we can verify safety and liveness properties on medical devices without composing the (large) complete systems. For example, let P 1 be the specication for some medical device, P 1 be an implementation of the actual device, P 2 be the external environment (e.g., app, patient) and φ be the desirable safety or liveness property. When designing the specication, the app developers make sure that P 1 ⊗ P 2 |= φ. We only need to check whether the device P 1 weakly modally renes the specication P 1 . If P 1 ≤ * m P 1 holds, then we can claim that P 1 ⊗ P 2 |= φ without actually verifying the composed system P 1 ⊗ P 2 . 
Case Study
Now we apply our proposed specication approach to analyze the closed-loop PCA example from Section 2. We model each system component (i.e., app, patient, Pulse Oximeter and PCA pump) as a MIOA. To answer the question that, from the three PCA pumps shown in Figure 2 , which one should we choose to use, we use the MIO Workbench tool [6] to check weather the MIOA of a pump weakly modally renes the MIOA of the pump specication. If the renement relation holds, then the pump is good in the sense that the PCA system should be able to guarantee the required safety property; otherwise, the pump is not safe to use.
To demonstrate that our approach can help to preserve system properties, we also use the (probabilistic) model checker PRISM [22] to verify the required safety property of composed PCA systems because of PRISM's relative maturity and ease of use. PRISM does not actually support the verication of MIOAs. We instead translate MIOAs as probabilistic automata (PAs): each must transition becomes a transition with probability 1 and each may transition becomes a transition with probability 0.5 1 . For example, Figure 6 shows the probabilistic translation of the MIOA in Figure 4a ; the may transition from s 0 to s 2 now becomes a transition with probability 0.5 (the black dot is the sink state). If PRISM veries that certain property is true with probability 1, then the property must" be satised by the on-demand medical system; and if the verication result is a real value p such that 0 < p < 1, then the system may" satisfy the property.
2
1 To make probabilistic distributions full, we complement each may transition with a transition (with probability 0.5) to a sink state; however, the verication result would exclude all the paths leading to the sink state.
2 While an evaluation of scalability is beyond the scope of this paper, PRISM implements a number of ecient model-checking algorithms for probabilistic systems and can scale to models with at least 10 7 states. Under this specication, if the pump is enabled by the on?" command from the app, then it can deliver drug to the patient at a normal infusion rate owRate!1"; however, if it is disabled by the o ?" command, then no drug will be delivered (owRate!0"). Some pump may allow receiving bolus?" request from the patient, which are described as may" transitions in the specication (dashed lines in Figure 10b ). To avoid the overdose of drug, the bolus?" request is only eective (i.e., the pump delivers drug at a higher rate owRate!2") when the pump is enabled by the app. A pump may shut itself down due to various reasons and may also restore from the shutdown; the specication allow these behavior by describing them may" transitions labelled with an internal action τ . When a pump is shutdown, it would not respond to any command from the app/patient and no drug will be delivered. We veried the safety property patient's SpO 2 level should always be above 94" on the PCA systems composed using these three devices. It is not surprising to nd that both systems of devices (a) and (c) satisfy the safety property, but the system of device (b) violates the property. The violation is due to the fact that device (b) always admits patients' bolus request even if the app has issued the o" command.
Analysis

Conclusion & Discussion
In this paper we have described an approach to specify on-demand systems and applied that approach to an example application from the medical domain.
This approach uses a specication language with the semantics of MIOA. We showed that weak modal renement can be used to check the compatibility between app requirements and device capabilites by proving that weak modal renement preserves both safety and liveness properties. This enables medical systems developers to express complex medical device behavioral requirements, explicitly specify allowed variability and reason about the behavior of on-demand systems a priori.
While we provided a case study as a proof-of-concept for the approach, there are many open questions concerning the engineering, safety and application of on-demand medical systems in a critical care setting. First we note that there are several areas where our proposed specication language and associated semantics would need to be extended to make the approach more applicable to real medical systems. For example, the action labels in our language are only tagged with simple data-types. Often, medical device actions relate directly to an interaction with the physical world (e.g., an infusion pump infusing a drug). It would be useful if action labels could also be tagged with physical types which would denote the physical interaction of the action. Furthermore, our approach only supports reasoning about discrete time systems. Real medical devices exhibit continuous time behavior, and the ability to capture real-time behavior is critical if we want to apply our approach to real medical systems. For example, the ondemand medical systems described in [3, 26, 18] all rely on`timeout' behavior in the medical devices to guarantee system safety in the presence of inter-device communications failures. Additionally, many medical devices exhibit continuous behavior in terms of their interactions with the patient. For example, infusion pumps deliver drugs continuously according to`trumpet' curves [28] . It is not known to what delity a specication will need to capture device behavior: Is continuous time plus discrete behavior enough, or is a fully hybrid specication required? The answer to this question will likely depend on the types of ondemand systems clinicians will want to employee. Second, the approach described in this paper requires that medical devices comply with their specications. In theory this seems reasonable, but in practice it may not be possible to have total condence in a device's compliance with its specication. For example, a device may be non-compliant due to an uncaught systematic defect (i.e., a design or implementation error), uncaught manufacturing errors, or unaccounted for environmental interference (e.g., artical light interfering with a physiologic sensor). Should the specication approach be extended to capture the possibility of these errors? If so, what types of errors and faults should be captured in the specication versus left to other risk management mechanisms?
Finally, medical devices can interact with each other indirectly through the patient (e.g., a pulse-oximeter attached to a patient on supplementary oxygen will sometimes give abnormally high readings). Should on-demand systems check for these types of interactions automatically? Or should we rely on the medical caregiver to determine which combinations of medical devices are appropriate to use in a given situation? The answer is not clear; though at rst it may appear that automatic interaction checking could improve the safety of the system, in practice doing thisis very dicult due to the fact we currently lack a detailed understanding of human physiology. This in turn can result in overly conservative or sensitive checks. For example, modern computerized physician order entry (CPOE) systems automatically check if a doctor prescribes drugs that may interact adversely. In many cases hospitals have worked with vendors to disable these checks because these checks are too conservative (i.e., generate an overwhelming number of alerts) and the caregivers are competent enough to know how the drugs will interact and whether or not the risk is justied for a particular patient [21] . The answer to this question will depend on the complexity of on-demand medical systems, our level of understanding of patient physiology, and the delity of care those system are intended to deliver.
